WHAT I GOT RIGHT
Thankfully, my research, product sense, and strategic vision allowed us to execute a few things correctly from the beginning. Our studio design – particularly our multi-sensory meditation room – received rave customer reviews and was adaptable enough to accommodate product pivots.
My instinct for hiring relatable, approachable, and grounded teachers was right: they were well-loved by clients and – in line with our overall brand and positioning – resonated with our targeted personas. By ensuring fit with the young professional persona, they also translated well to our pivot into B2B.
WHAT I GOT WRONG
Drop-in mindfulness classes – even with tangible progress metrics – simply didn't relieve enough of a pain point, or offer enough of a differentiated value-add over digital apps, to merit fitness-levels of spend and time. While this was masked by virality and hype directly
We ultimately overcame this challenge to achieve modest profitability through pivoting towards drop-in breathwork, high-ticket multi-week mindfulness courses, and B2B2C solutions sold to employers eager to invest in employee mental health. In a cruel fate of bad timing, however, we only managed to achieve this profitability milestone in January 2020.
Ultimately, no brick-and-mortar meditation studio survived the biggest challenge of them all: the prolonged impacts of COVID lockdowns. Indeed, many independent physical fitness studios without significant capitalization couldn't weather the storm either. However, it was clear from our experience that with or without the pandemic, drop-in mindfulness studios would always struggle to achieve profitability in high-rent urban areas, and the concept (as initially developed) was a classic tarpit idea.
Key learnings
Despite top-tier earned media, high levels of organic customer acquisition, and great reviews, I learned the only metric that truly mattered in the long-term was retention. If we couldn't secure repeat business, we were on a hamster wheel that would rapidly run out of steam and certainly couldn't scale beyond our four walls.
Our initial product fundamentally failed to alter consumer behavior and get prioritized week after week. We couldn't sustain a business on being a vitamin, we needed to be a painkiller – ultimately achieved through my pivot to breathwork. This experience solved a real pain point for busy professionals: offering an immediate, undeniable mental shift and physical release. It also allowed type-As to be immediately "good" at it, vs. the frustrating nature of mind-wandering during meditation.
Even with these pivots, we dramatically overestimated the available bandwidth our target demographic had to prioritize our offerings into their regular routines, despite their interest. This led us to pursue B2B2C opportunities, which was a win-win: employers could act upon their commitments towards promoting mental health, and employees didn't have to sacrifice any of their limited free time and disposable income to enjoy our services.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
In an alternate universe where the pandemic never happened and we were looking to capitalize on consistent profitability and scale physical locations, I'd implement key improvements to optimize the concept for scale.
On programming, we'd have gone all-in on breathwork for drop-in classes, continue expanding upon our profitable multi-week mindfulness-based courses, and introduce lucrative teacher training programs for breathwork.
To optimize the studio layout, we'd have cut back on living spaces (as they were not as widely taken advantage of as we had hoped). Instead, we'd have carved out a classroom for courses + increased the meditation room size to maximize mat capacity.
With a larger footprint, we'd have also incorporated even more immersive experiences like ice baths (evidenced by Othership's success, which launched its ice bath, infrared sauna, and breathwork concept in Toronto in early 2022, and has since expanded to cities like NYC).